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Howard P. Kainz, Milwaukee 
HEGEL, DEMOCRACY, AND THE »KINGDOM OF GOD«I 
Plato, in common with all his thinking contemporaries, 
perceived [the] demoralization of democracy and the 
defectiveness even of its principle; he set in relief ac-
cordingly the underlying principle of the state, but 
could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of 
subjectivity, which still escaped his intelligence. The 
state is therefore, on its own showing, wanting in sub-
jective liberty [ ... ]. It was not vouchsafed to Plato to go 
on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not 
spring up in the world and hold sway in political life, 
so long the genuine principle of the state had not come 
into actuality [ ... ]. In the Protestant conscience the 
principles of the religious and of the ethical conscience 
come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to 
see itself in its reasonableness and truth . In the Prote-
stant state, the constitution and the code, as well as their 
several applications, embody the principle and the de-
velopment of the moral life, which proceeds and can 
only proceed from the truth of religion. 
(Hegel, Philosophy of Mind § 552) 
Theologians, like philosophers, are not noted for their in-house agreements. But one area of considerable 
and long-standing consensus among both Catholic and Protestant theologians concerns the pivotal impor-
tance of the concept of a »kingdom of God« in Christianity. There are over a hundred references to the 
>>kingdom of God« or the »kingdom of heaven« in the Gospels; and it seems clear that the historical Jesus 
understood his mission primarily in terms of announcing-- or possibly bringing about-- this »kingdom. « 
I have to hedge and use disjunctions like »Or« or qualifiers like »possibly« at this point, because con-
cerning the precise nature of the »kingdom of God« there is now and always has been considerable and 
heated controversy among Christian interpreters . Was the Kingdom meant to come during the generation 
during which Christ lived? The early Christians began to abandon that interpretation a few centuries after 
Christ died. Was the Kingdom purely spiritual, or was it meant to free men from social and political op-
pression and establish justice on earth? Was the Kingdom to be identified with the Church or with some 
community of believers transcending all established Churches? Is the inauguration of the Kingdom some-
thing that depends on human initiative and control, or something completely dependent on the intervention 
of God in human history? 
These are not theoretical questions purely of interest to academicians. The interpretation of the meaning 
of the »kingdom of God« in Western Christian (or »post-Christian«) civilization is of the utmost importance 
for politics. It makes a great deal of difference , after all , whether we interpret the kingdom as a world em-
pire, as did Constantine's court -theologian, Eusebius , as well as Adolph Hitler when he in effect continued 
the Germanic »Holy Roman Empire« by inaugurating the Third Reich, although he eschewed the theologi-
cal connotations ; or as a world-wide Christian republic, as did Dante; or as the establishment of a purified 
community separate from the world, as did various monastic orders and as do the Mennonites and Amish in 
our day ; or as an apocalyptic event which will finally. rescue the faithful from the ineluctable injustice of 
secular governments, as the Jehovah 's Witnesses and Seventh-Day Adventi sts in our time interpret the 
Kingdom. 
In the post-World-War-II era, some of the most recent political-theological interpretations of the King-
dom of God have been reflected in the now-di~banded »Moral Majority« movement in the U.S. and the 
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still-continuing commitment to a social Kingdom .of God encapsulated in the Sojourner periodical; in the 
continuing drive towards a final acquisition of the promised land which characterizes many contemporary 
Zionists, including not only Jews but some conservative Christian theologians; in the passionate revolution-
ary struggle for the establishment of the final reign of justice, advocated by Latin American liberation theo-
logians and implemented in an inchoate way in »base communities<< in many Latin American countries; and 
in secularized but still recognizable form in Marxist movements, now in disarray and trying to reconnoitre 
after have striven against considerable odds to establish, not in some future world, but on this earth, a reign 
of peace and justice beyond capitalism made possible by the emergence of a new, socialized species of man. 
If there are any political ramifications related to one's theological interpretation of the Kingdom of God; 
these ramifications will of course be of the utmost importance for democracy. One who is committed to the 
idea of the Kingdom may want to know whether his theological ideal is consistent with, and possibly even 
conducive towards, democracy; one who is committed to democracy, on the other hand, should be inter-
ested in determining whether his political ideal is compatible with a long-standing and deeply-rooted theo~ 
logical tradition, or must in some way distance itself from that tradition. 
One initial obstacle in addressing such problems is the current and growing ambiguity of the term, 
»democracy«, itself. In recent times almost every kind of government, with the exception of an out-and-out 
dictatorship, has been self-styled as a »democracy.« Karl Marx in 1843 hailed communism as the harbinger 
of true democracy; and in recent decades various »people's democracies«, »democratic republics«, etc., 
have sprung up which are a long way from what we in the »Western world« consider to be the essential 
standards for democracy. The fact that some of these systems have now implemented »democratization« 
processes to counteract the Marxist version of democracy only sends us · back to the »drawing board« re-
garding the meaning of »democratization«: Does it require a free market? Are free elections the necessary 
and sufficient condition for democracy? Are constitutional »checks and balances« prerequisites for stable 
democracies? And so forth. Jacques Barzun observes that the common-denominator meaning of »democra-
cy« seems to be that »the people should be sovereign, and [that] this popular sovereignty implies political 
and social equality.«2 But this is perhaps too general. For in actual practice there is of course perpetual 
conflict even in »democratic« systems between equality and freedom, and the »people« means something 
different now, in the aftermath of 19th century industrial revolutions and 20th century social revolutions 
than it did in former eras. Even in the 18th century there was considerable diffidence among political 
theorists concerning the value of democracy. Rousseau came to the conclusion that democratic full-partici-
pation after the model of the ancient Athenian polity was simply impossible in a large nation; and the fathers 
of the American constitution were so diffident about the term, »democracy«, that they insisted on more pre-
cisely characterizing the government they were founding as a »democratic republic«, not as a »democracy.« 
In our own world of nation-states, what is left over from the classical democracy of the Greek polis is that 
minimal residue of meaning which Jacques Barzun adumbrates: a very general and overly vague notion con-
cerning the sovereignty of the people. 
Hegel agreed substantially with Madison and Jefferson, as well as with Rousseau, Kant, and others: 
»Democracy« was an unwieldy and impractical notion in the modern world. But instead of leaning, like the 
others, towards a replacement and sublimation of democracy with the traditional ideal of a »republic«, He-
gel advocated a more radical restructuring of the political ideal in terms of the essential notion of a free mo-
dem society, derived from the metaphysical basis of the speculative »Idea« (the idea of the reconciliation of 
opposites) developed in his Logic, and receiving fuller elaboration in his political philosophy. Ancient 
Greek democracy, according to Hegel, was the political zenith of an era of objective spirit in which it so 
· happened that the wills of individual citizens were intrinsically intertwined with the objective will manifested 
in the polity.3 The citizens had no conscience or »morality« in our modern sense; but they had virtue and 
Sittlichkeit, which prevented disharmony. The injection of subjectivity -- as exemplified by the anti-esta-
blishment comedies of Aristophanes and the iconoclastic philosophizing of Socrates -- destroyed the Greek 
spirit, and likewise makes their kind of democracy impossible in our own times, which are characterized 
and keynoted by subjectivity. 
Christianity, according to Hegel, renewed and intensified the question concerning subjectivity, with its 
emphasis on the worth of the individual and on the right of subjectivity to be satisfied and fulfilled.4 But 
Christianity also pointed the way to a solution, through its doctrine of the Incarnation. The Incarnation, 
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beyond the literal meaning of the advent of a man-God, was the symbol of the union of divine and human, 
subjective will and objective reality, freedom and nature, individual and community.5 The reconciliation of 
these opposites, and ultimately the reconciliation of God with himself, became, in Hegel's estimation, the 
leading idea of the Christian community which perpetuated and perpetuates a communal reenactment of the 
death and resurrection of the man-god throughout history. Although the Christian church was not always or 
even generally a worthy instrument for the accomplishment of this ideal, it did serve as a pre-philosophical 
custodian of the synthesizing Absolute Idea, down through the centuries. 
It is true, says Hegel, that under Roman Catholicism, the Church quickly began to appropriate for itself 
political power, as soon as it escaped from its second-class status under the Roman Empire. Then it began 
to build up a quasi-empire of its own, an »ecclesiastical Kingdom of God« which lorded it over secular aut-
horities and secular existence, intermittently attempting to control the state either by force , or by inculcating 
a division into church-related and non-church-related political parties.6 Nevertheless, he points out, such 
political excesses were simply the manifestation of the imperfect development within Catholicism of the 
Christian idea, which instead of arising to freedom kept mankind in a kind of spiritual slavery, oriented to-
wards the mere externals of spirituality under a pseudo-spiritual leadership imbued more with the secular 
spirit than with the spirit of God. 7 
But finally, Hegel tells us, with the advent of Protestantism, the Church awoke to its truly spiritual but 
essentially private calling. The vocation of the Church is, after all, something quite private -- not »private« 
in the pejorative sense, i.e. , in the way that Catholicism had been able to stand aloofly indifferent to count-
less abuses in the secular sphere;8 but private in the sense that the Church is a hidden source and divine 
springboard in the world for all authentic moral activity in the public sphere.9 For the inner kingdom of 
God, as conceived by Hegel, is a direct »vertical« relationship to the divine, the »horizontal« correlate to 
which is the state-- that ultimate community, the ethical and juridical arena where alone divine freedom and 
truth can be fully realized and guaranteed.lO 
It is unfortunate that Charles Taylor, Emil Fackenheim and many other commentators on Hegel ignore 
the important function of religion in Hegel's concept of the state. Hegel, like Kant; viewed politics as a de-
rivation from, and extension of, the moral order; but Hegel went beyond Kant in basing the moral order in 
religion, and specifically, in the modem world, .. in Protestant Christianity. 
In the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of the ethical conscience come to be one 
and the same: the free spirit learning to see itself in its reasonableness and truth. In the Protestant state, the 
constitution and the code, as well as their several applications, embody the principle and the development of 
the moral life, which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of religion.ll 
Protestantism was not only the foundation for moral and just interpersonal relations, but the indis-
pensable means for building up the entire edifice of secular relations encapsulated in the state.12 Under 
Protestantism, according to Hegel, there was no longer any need for the cyclical but incessant alienated 
conflict between »church and state«; for Protestantism itself was the realization -- albeit an abstract realiza-
tion-- of the final reconciliation of the political and the religious.l 3 
One would think offhand that democracy would fare very well under the criterion of Hegel's Absolute 
Idea. Does not democracy, even in Jacques Barzun's common-denominator meaning, incorporate subjec-
tivity to a high degree, and take steps to insure the representation of grassroots personhood in a fair manner 
at the highest levels of government? Yes, of course. But in Hegel's mind democracy is only an imperfect 
step in the right direction. Hegel, no doubt thinking of Rousseau's political philosophy, castigates de-
mocracy for offering just one more quantitative solution to the problem of the representation of subjectivity 
(in other words, instead of just one or a few subjectivities being represented, the majority of personhood-
units being »represented« in democracy); and he disapproves of democracy also for inculcating a simplistic, 
mathematical idea of human equality-- in contemporary terms, >>one man, one vote.«l4 But such a »solu-
tion«, in Hegel's view, is incapable of dealing with the truly qualitative problems presented by subjectivity 
in the modem world. Democratic constitutions are in the final analysis overly cerebral constructions of spi-
rit, depending on artificial devices like the »separation of powers« and »checks and balances« to stave off 
the self-destructiveness of what is essentially an unhealthy adversary relationship. And they aim at a utopian 
equality, which can only be reached in the spiritual realm, in the Kingdom of God, the inception of which is 
to be found on this earth in (Protestant) Christianity .15 In short, democracy is simply incapable of dealing 
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with the complexities of modern subjectivity, 6f guaranteeing the maximum qualitative representation of 
·individuals who may be spiritually equal but manifest all manner of natural and material differences in any 
empirical society. · 
The solution in Hegel's philosophy is the development of political relations in conformity to the specu-
lative-dialectical »Idea« of the unity of opposites, which in politics translates into an intrinsic reconciliation 
of objective order and subjective aspiration, necessity and freedom, nature and spirit. In conformity to this 
Idea, the state should correspondingly be based and built up upon the various »natural« divisions of the 
subjectivities which compose it -~ classes, »estates<<, unions and associations, as well as majorities, 16 so 
that freedom can be shored up and perpetuated by being rooted in what is natural and inevitable. In accord 
with the same principles, Hegel, as is well-known, opted for a constitutional monarchy, in which the natu-
ral individuality and familial succession to the throne of the monarch would be coordinated with the spiritual 
excogitations of parliamentary government, as the final unifying device in a free society. 
We should not be too hasty in dismissing Hegel's royalist critique of democracy as reactionary and 
outdated. Although we may view the problem of the »Coordination of nature and spirit« as a problem that 
only an adamant German idealist could think up and try to .solve, there are situations frequently arising in 
the world's democracies, in which we might wish for something very much like the bolstering of nature 
itself to prop up the institutions and policies excogitated by the rational spirits of incumbent governments. A 
believing Hegelian might want to compare the astounding stability and security through thick and thin of a 
constitutional monarchy like that in England with the instability and chaotic periodic successions of the par-
liamentary democracy in Italy; he might point with disdain at the frequent neglect of the business of go-
vernments like the U.S. for extended periods of time preceding elections in which the incumbent president 
is a candidate; and finally, he might top off his critique with smug comments about the quality of president 
that often results (no names, please) from all the interminable electoral processes. But one does not have to 
be a hypercritical monarchist to ask: would it not be a boon to any free, democratic society to bring in nature 
as an ever-present support of spirit through natural groupings and what Hegel designated as »corporations« 
-- municipalities, economic associations, professional groups, labor organizations, religious congregations, 
etc.? And might not Hegel be right at least in his general observation that the Protestant Church (and per-
haps even a suitably protestantized Catholicism!) can and perhaps must be a spiritual ally of the state info-
stering the concepts of individual freedom, personal morality and responsibility, and freedom of thought, 17 
which are important for building up a government based more on initiative from below than coercion from 
above? · 
On the other hand, Hegel's position has important structural defects which even a critic of democracy 
should be aware of: For one thing, monarchy is a rather arbitrary way of uniting nature with freedom in 
political administration; and, as Theunissen points out, the monarch whose mission is to unite nature and 
spirit is playing the part of a Christ-figure in Hegel's schema, a role which most monarchs even in Hegel's 
time would presumably not consciously aspire to, let alone be capable of.18 It is also quite conceivable that 
other more satisfactory ways of »uniting nature and spirit« than monarchy could be devised with some mi-
nimal effort and ingenuity. For example, would not a meritocracy, requiring tests for aptitude, intelligence 
and experience as a prerequisite for being elected to the highest government offices, be a logical, albeit com-
plicated, way of coordinating natural ability with the determinations of »Spirit«? Or one could reasonably 
maintain, along with Alexis de Toqueville, that the perennial division in politics into conservative and liberal 
camps is not just an accident of history, but something natural and intrinsic to political systems -- a »natu-
ral« division whose recognition and institutionalization is a prerequisite for modem enlightened politics. But 
in a more fundamental sense can we not argue forcibly that democracy itself is precisely the sort of union of 
nature and spirit that someone like Hegel might be looking for, insofar as democracy joins the organiza-
tional forces of government with the sine qua non of voluntary initiative and participation by the governed 
(the sort of thing that erstwhile communist governments have belatedly been trying to inculcate by their »de-
mocratization« programs)? In a somewhat similar vein Hartmann suggests that Hegel could have elaborated 
a similarly sound idealistic political theory based on a republican rather than monarchical constitution.l9 The 
real philosophical problem for Hegel and Hegelians, Hartmann points out, is to bring about a synthesis of 
the rational-speculative »Category« in Hegel's system with anthropology. Such a synthesis would be neces~ 
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sary in order to demonstrate just how the existential >~communion« of the citizens can be conjoined with the 
reason and organicity emphasized in Hegel's system.20 
But let us put aside for the moment questions about whether or not a democratic or republican govern-
ment might be the best way, pace Hegel, to bring about the ideal of a free society. Granted that a free so-
ciety and a free state is an ideal that we share in common with Hegel, what is to be said about Hegel's pro-
posal for overcoming the counterproductive adversary relationship between religion and government which 
had characterized Catholic eras, with a new cooperative and complementary relationship? Should the rela-
tion of church and state be, in the aftermath of the benefits that have been derived from the separation of 
churches from each other,21 an »inseparable union«22 in the context of the Absolute Idea? We of course 
have considerable benefit from hindsight in answering that question. We know, for example, that the Pro-
testantism whose spirit of freedom Hegel prized was no bulwark of individual freedom in Germany during 
the era of National Socialism. And Catholics can scarcely feel superior in this respect, since Catholics by 
and large also kept silence-- a German bishop achieving a last-minute »success« in preventing Pope Pius 
XI from nearly issuing a public wamingagainst Hitler's anti-semitism. But this is just one example. We in 
the latter part of the twentieth century have a sufficiently broad outlook on the history of close unions bet-
ween politics and religion (whether Protestant, Catholic or non-Christian) to know that too close a relation-
ship can be at least as deleterious, if not more so, than the opposite. In any case, it is obviously in the area 
of church-state relations that Hegel's interpretation of the »Kingdom of God« becomes most crucial and 
foundational. And this is the subject on which our final attention should be focused. 
In Protestantism for rather obvious reasons there has been a reluctance to accept the position of Augu-
stine that the visible Church is the »present kingdom of God« preparing the way for the »end times«. To the 
Augustinian monk, Martin Luther, as well as to his religious successors, it was obvious that to associate the 
»kingdom of God« with the visible church would be to forfeit the possibility of reform and to compromise 
with the prevailing virulent abuses of religion and religious authority. Hegel as a convinced Lutheran was 
likewise unwilling to designate the locus of spiritual freedom in any visible organization, and in particular in 
the Catholic Church, which, Hegel observes, although experiencing a thrust toward democracy in the tradi-
tional processes of electing the Pope, had become by and large a bastion of aristocratic conservatism 
through the power of priestly consecration. A church with a spiritual elite standing far above the secular 
world could never be an appropriate vehicle for, or perpetuator of, »infinite« freedom, i.e. concrete rather 
than abstract self-determination in the world and in secular society. Hegel did, however, agree with Augu-
stine in the now extremely controversial opinion (among theologians) that the Church is the present King-
dom of God.23 And for Hegel this presence is, so to speak, at the center of social and public life: 
The church is the kingdom of God, the achieved presence, life, preservation; and enjoyment of the 
Spirit[ ... ]. Family, property, temporal concerns arise of themselves, [and in tum give rise to] laws and 
governance; and all that is needed is that out of the womb of the church there be formed a free life, <a 
civil and> political life, stemming from eternal principles, <a rational, worldly kingdom in accord with 
the idea of freedom and the absolute character of rights. With what is legal, rational, and universal be-
longing in this way to the worldly sphere, there remains to the church the salvation of individual souls 
-- [the sphere of] particular subjectivity; the worldly universal becomes its own affair.>24 
Hegel's position has elicited considerable criticism for its overly facile identification of present and 
eschaton, secular and sacred.25 Ironically, it is now the German theologians who seem to argue most for-
cibly against any neo-Hegelian attempt to locate the Gospel idea of the »Kingdom of God«-- which seems 
to them to refer textually to some future event -- in the temporally extant Church or in any present institution 
or phenomenon in the world. But Hegel also poses a problem for theologians and practitioners of political 
theology: If the Kingdom of God is present but not to be identified with any visible church, then in what 
sense is it indeed present? and where? Hegel answers this question quite straightforwardly in thepassage 
just cited: It is located in the inner sanctum of subjectivity, a reservoir of spiritual resources springing up 
from private depths and quietly transforming public life and political relationships. How does it do this? Not 
by church activity or liturgy, not by lobbying for religious causes or attempts at conversion, but simply by 
producing an everyday reconciliation of the spiritual and the secular in ordinary life by means of individuals 
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who have already brought about a foundatiomil reconciliation of the spiritual and the secular within their 
own personality. All in all, we find in Hegel a deCisive and concerted effort to counterbalance what he con-
sidered to be the rampant alienations found in the history of the relationship of the Christian religion to the 
world. But does he not go too far in the other direction? 
It should be remembered that Hegel was not only a product ofhis time, but also thought a philosopher 
had no choice but to be a product of his time;26 and presumably was also quite satisfied with this limitation 
on one's philosophizing. But if philosophers are indeed products of their own time, we in our time at least 
have the benefit of an extra century-and-a-half of history --a history which i.ncludes the phenomena of 
compliant Christians under Nazism, a largely cooperative Orthodox Church under Bolshevism, nationalistic 
Protestantism and Catholicism in Ireland, militant politicized Islam in Iran, etc. The unavoidable conclusion 
for one objectively surveying the empirical past since Hegel's era would simply have to be that too great a 
unity (even non-institutional) between church and state is as great a mistake as institutionalized conflict or 
jockeying for power between churchmen and statesmen. 
European theologians, perhaps influenced by the flawed history of attempts to erect the Kingdom of 
God, and its corresponding »Reichs«, on earth, have by and large adopted an eschatological interpretation 
of the Kingdom. European commentators, following the lead. of Albert Schweitzer and others, tend towards 
»consistent eschatology«-- the idea that all Gospel references to the »kingdom« have to be understood as 
references to a future coming. The Kingdom is something to be attained at the »end time«, through the in-
tervention of God, certainly not something to be produced in neo-Pelagian fashion by initiatives and organi-
zation on the part of the church. American theologians in contrast have until recently tended towards »reali-
zed eschatology«-- the notion that the Kingdom of God came with the coming of Christ, with the spiritual 
power that Christ in his life manifested over the forces of evil. Some theologians have tried to combine both 
positions -- future and present eschatology -- without contradiction. But the general picture we are presented 
with in theology is one of continuing controversy. 
The problem of defining the appropriate relationship of church and state may be most formidable for 
Protestant theologians. For, on the one hand; scandals in the visible church were the springboard for Pro-
testantism in the first place; on the other, a strictly invisible, strictly private church, if it has anything to do 
with the inauguration of a Kingdom of God on earth, must, it would seem, have to do so, by default as it 
were, in and through the most formidable earthly power, the state. If the church is construed as in some 
sense a visible organization, and not just as a plurality of sects and denominations all of which may be true 
or false propagators of Christianity, then there still is, of course, the problem of distancing and clearly diffe-
rentiating it (the »one true reformed church«) from that ancient and clearly visible organization whose per-
ceived abuses gave rise to Protestantism in the first place. 
Since it is just possible that Hegel may have been right in his contention that philosophers can say 
nothing reliable about the future, I will abstain from prophecy and simply conclude here by cautiously poin-
ting to two current developments, one in religion and the other in politics, that, in a sense -- which I will 
adumbrate at the end -- receive clarification and perhaps justification from past history: 
1) In religion, the ecumenical movement: This movement over the last few decades has been primarily 
concerned with reuniting Catholics, Protestant and orthodox Christians, although its ultimate objective may 
be to unite all major world religions. If this movement is indeed successful in bridging the differences bet-
ween Christians, a corollary result would seem to be that it will help obviate that nagging traditional pro-
blem, just alluded to above, about whether the Kingdom of God can be connected with any present and vi-
sible church or not. For the »visible« church would be the single, reunited consortium of Protestant, Catho-
lic and Orthodox churches, no longer needing to appeal to some »invisible« church over and above some 
formidable visible ecclesial organization deemed no longer worthy of the title of »Christian.« 
2) In politics, international federative movements: It would seem that the main movements of interest in 
this respect are the current movement towards European federation, supported by Fran9ois Mitterand and 
Helmut Kohl and other European leaders; but also the ongoing development of the movement towards con-
federation in the United Nations, which we tend to take for granted. This latter process, which is becoming 
more and more pluralistic with the access to representation of various third-world countries, not only runs 
parallel to the ecumenical movement but seems to be complementary, although manifesting and eliciting still -
unresolved clashes of opinion regarding political ideology and the nature of »democracy«. 
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It goes without saying that both of these contemporary developments would jar Hegel, who could ne-
ver envision or countenance arty rapprochement between Catholics and Protestants, let alone Orthodox; and 
who, pace Kant, could find nothing admirable or even rational in the idea of some international federation 
transcending the nation-state.27 But, as I will now show, such developments would in a sense seem to be 
higher or »sublated« developments of a past stage -- the sort of development that Hegel characteristically 
extolled. 
A recent book by William Everett, God's Federal Republic,28 advocates a change of political-theologi-
cal symbolism from »kingdom« to »republican federation«, in the interests of both Christianity and of de-
mocracy. Everett's thesis seems at first blush to be of a rather utilitarian stripe (»what sort of combination of 
political and theological interpretations would be most useful?«). But there is more than utilitarian appeal in 
Everett's thesis. We must take into consideration the fact that the earliest interpretation of the idea of the 
Kingdom of God was the ancient Hebrew confederation oftwelve tribes under the leadership of God alone, 
a political structuring which was primordially democratic, since it included elections, processes for dismis-
sal of incompetent or irresponsible leaders, guarantees of individual rights, and other features which we in 
our day consider to be intrinsic to democratic constitutions. In view of the practices of the ancient Hebrews, 
Everett was possibly wrong in arguing so strenuously that we must change the dominant religious-political 
symbol from kingdom to federation. If indeed the »Kingdom of God« for Moses and Joshua and Gideon 
meant unambiguously a confederation under God as king, rather than the theocratic Hebrew kingdom which 
was later inaugurated over the protests of the judge-and-prophet Samuel, Everett should opt more consi-
stently for a return to the original idea of the Kingdom. 
The reason why the ancient Hebrews felt impelled to abandon confederation for kingdom was that they 
concluded that confederative unity was not strong enough to offer defense against threats from foreign for-
ces. If they had been able to forge a stronger union for consolidation and defense by moving from confe-
deration to federation, as did the American colonies in the 18th century, this would perhaps have alleviated 
some of the endemic problems in succeeding centuries regarding the proper interpretation of the »Kingdom 
of God«. But such a solution was not available or even conceivable at that time. 
Hegel's vision of a quasi-organic quasi-liberal state as the ultimate citadel of freedom prevented him 
from giving serious consideration to the excessively Kantian idea of international federation; and his inter-
pretation of Lutheran Christianity as involving a strictly spiritual, private, individual presence of the 
»kingdom of God« made it unnecessary for him to attach great importance to a visible organizational unity 
of Christians. But if the vision of past history that we now have were available to him, and if he had taken 
into account the earliest developments of the idea of a »kingdom of God«, perhaps his much-celebrated 
»Owl of Minerva«, whose wisdom beams forth only at the end of the long day,29 would have led him to a 
different conclusion. 
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